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A pluralist approach to teaching economics needs to deal with the particular challenge 
posed by mainstream economics. There is an asymmetry between mainstream 
economics and most other approaches to economics in that mainstream economics 
presents itself as the sole arbiter of what does and what does not count as economics. 
Rather than being pluralist (advocating a range of approaches), it has traditionally 
been monist (advocating only one general approach). Thus, while other approaches, 
being pluralist, pay attention to mainstream economics and take the time and trouble 
to explain their approaches in relation to the mainstream, the mainstream recognises 
no such need.  
What is often misunderstood about pluralism is that, while, on the one hand, 
pluralism means accepting that other approaches may be legitimate in their own 
terms, pluralism is perfectly consistent also with arguing against these terms. There is 
an important distinction between arguing that one’s own alternative approaches is 
preferable to others in terms of one’s own criteria, knowing that no one approach can 
lay claim to truth (pluralism), and arguing against alternatives because they are 
thought to be demonstrably wrong (monism). But given that monism in effect 
purports to define the discipline, there is an important difference between arguing, as 
a pluralist, that another approach is not (by one’s own terms) good economics, and 
arguing, as a monist, that another approach (by one’s own terms) is not even 
economics. 
Since many students are exposed to mainstream economics and its exclusivist 
approach, the initial hurdle is for them to recognise that other approaches are also 
economics. The second hurdle, which follows, is to recognise that any argument in 
economics is contestable, and contestable on a range of grounds, such that students 
themselves may reasonably have differences of opinion – with their fellow-students, 
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with what they read and with what they are taught. Once these hurdles are overcome, 
the field is open for a much wider and richer discourse. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how teaching the history of thought 
and methodology can help students overcome these hurdles, and then help them to 
formulate this richer discourse. It will be argued that history and methodology are 
usefully taught as specialist subjects specifically to address the hurdles posed by the 
mainstream mindset which many students inherit. However, these hurdles having 
been overcome, history of thought and methodology are most effective when 
integrated into the teaching of the content of economic theory. We begin with 
methodology, in order to clarify what is meant by pluralism. 
 
The Methodology of Economics 
The term methodology itself needs some consideration. As with most of the terms we 
use, its meaning depends on the approach to knowledge we employ. Again the most 
important distinction is between the monist mainstream approach and pluralist 
approaches. The mainstream approach takes for granted that the method of economics 
is mathematical (see eg Allen, 2000), combining analyses arrived at by deductive 
logic from axioms of rational individual behaviour. The advantages of this method are 
that all arguments are put on an equal footing for easy comparison and checking of 
logic (they are ‘commensurate’), and that the conclusions of the analysis can be tested 
empirically against the facts. This is the methodology of logical positivism (Caldwell 
1982). Methodology then is only concerned with the particular mathematical 
techniques used in theory and in econometric testing: a purely technical subject. 
But the experience of using this method continues to pose wider 
methodological questions, and indeed is doing so increasingly as applied economics 
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gains in strength relative to pure, deductivist economics. An increasing number of 
mainstream analyses are empirical, drawing on much wider ranges of evidence than in 
the past (surveys, experiments etc), and increasingly these analyses do not make 
explicit reference to optimising models. Indeed some even challenge the content of 
the rationality axioms, as in experimental economics. The practice of mainstream 
economics seems to be departing in important ways from the principles of logical 
positivism, but without alternative methodological principles in place.  What we are 
seeing, therefore, is what some identify as growing pluralism within mainstream 
economics (see for example Vromen 2007, Davis 2008), but without methodological 
discussion (Dow 2007). 
Once we open up the question of how best to do economics, then we are in the 
field of methodology proper, extending beyond questions of technique to questions of 
philosophy of knowledge (‘epistemology’): given the subject matter of the economy, 
what are the best ways of building knowledge about it? The role of mathematical 
formalism is opened up for scrutiny, but so are many other aspects of  knowledge 
often taken for granted. For example, the very notion of ‘facts’ is open to question. 
There is scope for understanding the nature of the economy differently, and analysing 
it in terms of different theories. What seems like a fact to one group of analysts may 
be questionable to others. For example, to a new classical economist all 
unemployment is by definition voluntary (since all agents are rational), while to a 
Keynesian economist unemployment is generally involuntary. If mathematical 
argument is open to question (as the sole vehicle for argument) and if we do not have 
an uncontested set of facts independent of theory, then there are serious 
methodological questions to consider, as to how we do economics. 
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The more we explore methodological questions, once these are opened up in 
this way, the more important becomes the scope for variety, or plurality. Plurality may 
indeed be inevitable. If there is no one shared understanding of the nature of reality 
(‘ontology’), far less of how best to build knowledge about it, then inevitably there is 
going to be variety of opinion. Pluralism goes further in arguing that this variety is 
welcome, and to be supported. In order to explore why that may be the case, we need 
to be clear as to what we are talking about. 
Pluralism applies at a range of levels, which are sometimes confused in the 
literature (as explained by Mearman 2008). These levels are: understanding of reality 
(ontology), theory of knowledge (epistemology), approach to the practice of 
economics (methodology), and theory. At the level of ontology, the distinction is 
drawn between understanding the economy as an open system or as a closed system. 
If it is closed, then behaviour is law-like and it is in principle possible to identify these 
laws. This is the presumption of the traditional mainstream approach, which seeks 
confirmation for theory in empirical evidence of event regularities. Deviations from 
lawlike behaviour are understood as reactions to ‘shocks’; as events known to be 
random (and this is a strong knowledge presumption), these shocks are part of the 
closed system.  
It does not take much to see the economy instead as an open system. For many 
economists, the economy is understood to evolve, to be subject to forces which evolve 
(there is no extrinsic closure), and human interactions at the institutional and 
individual level evolve (there is no intrinsic closure) (Lawson 1997). But it only takes 
one of the conditions for closure not to be met in order for the system to be open 
(Chick and Dow 2005).  
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If the economy is an open system (or even if it is a closed system, but our 
human limitations prevent us from seeing that), then there are consequences for how 
we build knowledge about it. An open system evolves, and evolves in a variety of 
ways in a variety of contexts (otherwise it would be possible to establish laws of 
evolution and we would be back to a closed system). We would expect a variety of 
understandings of the nature of reality, and therefore a variety of approaches to 
building knowledge about it, ie methodologies. Even if we all start with a general 
open-system understanding of reality, we very quickly develop different approaches 
to building knowledge about it. The general theory of knowledge therefore supports 
pluralism at the level of methodology. Once we move away from closed systems, we 
no longer have any demonstrably superior methodology. 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1970a, 1970b) concept of paradigm is useful here. Kuhn’s 
study of the history of astronomy demonstrated that knowledge develops within 
communities which have shared understandings of reality, a shared approach to 
knowledge, and thus shared meanings of terms, shared techniques and shared theories. 
Knowledge progresses, but only by the criteria of a particular paradigm. Purveyors of 
the paradigm argue for the relative merits of their approach to knowledge, and 
communicate it by teaching from textbooks full of exemplars; in this way, through 
persuasion, paradigms grow in strength. There may be debate with other paradigms, 
and indeed knowledge may progress as a result of this interchange (again by the 
criteria of a particular paradigm). But there is no basis for an authority to adjudicate 
between paradigms, in order to establish the one best paradigm.  
Knowledge builds up within the dominant paradigm, fending off challenges to 
their understanding of reality and in the form of contrary evidence, until this becomes 
untenable. A revolutionary episode then instates an alternative paradigm, with its own 
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understanding of reality, meaning of terms, set of techniques and theories. But there is 
no independent set of criteria by which to compare the two paradigms (because the 
subject matter is open and so cannot generate one best way of establishing truth). The 
paradigms are not directly comparable: there may be scope for some communication 
(they are not completely incommensurate), but nor are they commensurate. We come 
back to this question of commensurability below; see further Rossini, Sandri and 
Scazzieri (eds) (1999) with respect to Kuhn. 
It is better therefore to allow for a range of paradigms so that there is a range 
of alternatives available. As in biology, a species is more likely to survive if there is a 
range of strains. Then when the environment changes, the current strain will decline 
and another more suited to the new environment will emerge. But also, given that 
there is variety of opinion, a range of paradigms allows knowledge to develop in 
parallel according to different approaches. This range of paradigms is however bound 
to be limited. Knowledge progresses within communities. So if meanings differ 
between paradigms, than individualistic paradigms inevitably fail through a failure of 
communication. Pluralism is sometimes misunderstood as ‘anything goes’ – this 
would be a ‘pure’ form of pluralism. But if indeed any economist could claim 
anything as fact and any theory as good, that would be the end of knowledge. Rather, 
in order to be workable, pluralism needs to be structured around a limited number of 
approaches (Dow 2004a). This is not a matter of signing up to manifestos, just a 
matter of the practicalities of functioning within the society of economics. As well as 
choosing how to do economics ourselves, we have to consider which conferences to 
attend, which journals to subscribe to etc, according to whose approach is closest to 
one’s own and therefore where communication is likely to be most productive. As 
with all these things, categories (as in paradigms) are a helpful shorthand, but the 
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reality rarely involves strict boundaries. Indeed many great economists are great 
because they creatively intermingle ideas from more than one paradigm.  
This is how pluralism is most commonly understood: at the epistemological 
and methodological levels. It refers to an acceptance that an open-system subject 
matter can be understood in a variety of ways, and therefore it is beneficial to have a 
range of approaches to building knowledge about it. It is a matter of tolerance which 
goes beyond the level of common academic courtesy and ethics, compelling though 
such considerations are (McCloskey 1994, Screpanti 1997). It follows from the nature 
of the subject matter that there can be no universal best way of establishing 
knowledge, so that it is better to allow a range of approaches to flourish in order to 
have more reliable knowledge overall. However, it does not mean that individual 
economists should follow more than one approach to knowledge. That way madness 
lies – it is incoherent simultaneously to sustain competing understandings of reality 
and meanings of terms. Any synthesising of different approaches to knowledge, if it is 
coherent, must be a new approach to knowledge. 
But pluralism is often discussed also at other levels, notably the levels of 
method and of theory. How this is discussed depends crucially on whether pluralism 
is supported also at the level of approach to knowledge, or not. If pluralism is denied 
at the methodological level, then there is a presumption that there is one best way of 
approaching knowledge. This best way might consist of a range of methods and it 
might yield a range of theories, as in the case of mainstream economics. But a monist 
position at the methodological level presumes that the subject matter is such as to 
yield laws to account for human behaviour, which implies that the mathematical 
method is sufficient, and in principle one theory should emerge to represent these 
laws. This thinking is implicit in mainstream discussion which implies that there is 
 8 
one best model to represent reality. For example, model uncertainty in the context of 
monetary policy is taken to mean that there is uncertainty in identifying this one best 
model (Dow 2004b). The growing plurality which many commentators have 
identified in the methods and theories of mainstream economics is therefore not 
coherent with the underlying monist methodological approach. It doesn’t make sense. 
Indeed some who are pursuing different methods and theories have the explicit goal 
of bringing them within the traditional deductivist framework (see for example 
Kahneman 2003, and Hong and Stein, 2007, with respect to experimental economics). 
If a pluralist approach is taken to methodology, because of the nature of the 
subject matter, then pluralism in terms of methods and theories within one particular 
approach among the range which structured pluralism throws up does make sense. If a 
range of approaches is regarded as supported by the complexity of the subject matter, 
then it would not be surprising to find that these approaches would tend not to rely on 
one particular method.  
Keynes (1921) provides guidance on this. When we aim to establish reasoned 
grounds for belief under uncertainty, we construct arguments on the basis of a range 
of types of reasoned argument, evidence, conventional judgment and intuition. We 
attach greater weight to an argument if it is supported by more relevant evidence. 
Thus if an argument is supported by a range of methods of argument (conceptual, 
mathematical, historical etc) and by a range of types of evidence (data series, survey 
evidence, experimental evidence, discussions with experts, etc) we attach high weight 
to it. Inevitably using a range of methods, but more generally with an open-systems 
approach to knowledge, there will be different theories as partial contributions to 
knowledge. If there is no expectation of establishing knowledge about the economy in 
the form of one complete best model, then knowledge is built up by a range of partial 
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models and theories, which aim to explain some aspect of reality. Further these 
models and theories are treated as provisional, recognising that evolution of the 
economy over time, and differences between economies over space, may require 
adaptations. 
There remains an issue as to how to compare and discuss different theories 
arrived at using different methods. How far are they incommensurable? If the 
advantage of the mathematical method is that it makes all theories commensurate, 
then how do we handle the consequences of a plurality of methods and theories? 
Clearly there is some incommensurability, but is it absolute or a matter of degree? 
This question has particular significance when considering theoretical differences 
between mainstream and non-mainstream economics. Is communication possible 
across methodological divides? Communication is made difficult by such basic 
factors as difference in meaning attached to terms, as well as the monist mainstream 
logic excluding anything which does not fit their methodological approach as not 
being economics. Clearly communication difficulties are of a different order from 
those between different pluralist approaches.  
I would suggest that some communication is possible. The subject matter is 
the same, and there are overlaps of meaning. Further, the unofficial discourse of 
mainstream economists differs from the monist official discourse (McCloskey 1983). 
Indeed much of the plurality of modern mainstream economics, however incoherent it 
is with the methodological approach, represents attempts to develop theory which 
more closely reflects reality. Further, as Marshall and Keynes argued, vagueness of 
language has the particular benefit of allowing communication where there are 
differences of meaning and understanding (Coates 1996, Davis 1999). Open systems 
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thinking means an absence of watertight boundaries and therefore the scope for some 
communication, ie less-than-absolute incommensurability. 
 
History of Economic Thought 
Studying the history of economic thought is an ideal way to understand these issues 
relating to pluralism. The first issue to address is methodological pluralism. If there is 
one best approach to economics, then the history of thought can be understood as a 
process whereby that approach is gradually perfected and knowledge about lawlike 
behaviour approaches closer and closer to the truth. From that perspective, there is 
only antiquarian interest in studying the history of thought. Everything of value is 
already embedded in modern economics. This view has been expressed eg by Paul 
Samuelson. As Klaes (2003: 497) observes: ‘More than four decades ago , Paul 
Samuelson …  noted with contempt that it was those economists who were not 
sufficiently competent to follow the mathematical revolution of postwar economics 
who were seeking shelter in the history of economic thought’. 
However, if economic systems have evolved over time, there are differences 
between economic systems in different parts of the world, and different methods have 
been employed to develop different types of theories over history, then there is a rich 
plurality to study in the history of thought which can yield ideas for the present. The 
history of thought opens our eyes to the existence and content of a range of 
possibilities. And indeed, since monism is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
economics (dating arguably from the middle of the twentieth century; see Morgan and 
Rutherford, eds, 1998), the prior history of thought provides ample examples of 
plurality, and a changing plurality, over the years without any necessity to consider 
the orthodox-heterodox divide which orthodox monism has created. Indeed, referring 
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to the argument for pluralism as a matter of academic courtesy, studying the history of 
thought itself discourages any presumption that modern economics is inevitably to be 
thought of as superior; it has the effect of increasing respect for the past and a greater 
modesty about the present. 
As far as teaching is concerned, the key first step is to get students over the 
hurdle of presuming that thought necessarily progresses in some sense, and indeed 
that textbook accounts are as close to the truth as economists so far have been able to 
reach. Certainly most mainstream teaching involves some attention to differences 
between theories, but the tenor of such discussion tends to be along the lines of right 
and wrong, truth and falsity. The rhetoric literature draws our attention to how this is 
achieved (see eg Klamer 1995). Mainstream monism has had the unfortunate side-
effect of classifying difference from heterodoxy (if it is recognised at all) as 
ideological difference (by implication something separate from economics). The 
history of thought provides a less dualistic way of understanding theoretical, and 
methodological, difference. 
In my experience, the most effective way of helping students get over the 
hurdle of initially approaching history of thought from the modern mainstream 
perspective (if that is all they know) is to set a particular exercise. They are invited to 
choose any economic text which has attracted their attention (something they agree 
with particularly, or disagree with, or find particularly elegant, or topical, or 
whatever) and explain to the group why they chose it. The very act of inviting 
students to express an opinion about a text is an eye-opener to many of them. I usually 
do this about a week into lectures, by which time we have already started discussing a 
historical text; some students find something which attracts their attention in this text, 
and therefore get off to a good start in studying history of thought. For others who 
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choose contemporary texts, the very act of expressing an opinion about them other 
than in the same terms as the author (progress with respect to other ideas) equally gets 
them over the notion that they have to take what is written at face value, and that there 
is scope for differing opinions about texts; here discussion among the group plays a 
vital role. My experience has been that, until this exercise, students generally don’t 
know what to make of the history of thought. But from then on they engage in it with 
increasing enthusiasm, reporting how it helps them understand the literatures in their 
other courses much better. 
There has of course been much debate as to how history of thought should be 
approached (see Weintraub’s introduction to a special 2002 issue of History of 
Political Economy he edited, which was devoted to this debate). Again the approach 
to knowledge is significant. The view that knowledge inevitably progresses 
encourages history of thought as an account of that progress. But increasing 
challenges to this view have encouraged different approaches to the history of 
thought. One alternative has been to study history in order to identify ‘wrong 
turnings’, providing historical authority for alternative approaches to modern 
economics. It has been common to criticise heterodox economists for using history of 
thought in this way. In particular it has been argued that studying history of thought 
from the perspective of a modern agenda (of either progress or wrong turnings) 
distorts interpretation.   
Indeed perhaps the dominant approach now is to follow the approach of the 
historian Quentin Skinner (1969, 1988), which is to attempt to understand as well as 
possible the context in which texts were written, and the intentions of the author. This 
approach explicitly engages with the argument that meaning is not independent of 
context and intention, so that a particular effort is required of the historian to escape 
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from modern preconceptions. In effect what is required is an effort to understand the 
paradigm of the author. This approach to history of thought therefore itself aids an 
understanding of paradigmatic difference away from the heat of debate in modern 
economics. It also illustrates issues of incommensurability, while requiring some 
degree of commensurability. 
For some methodologists there has been a movement so far away from the 
rule-setting stance of traditional methodology that all that is deemed possible is 
description (of ideas and context). This movement, which applies much more broadly 
than economics, is sometimes called science studies. It too, of course, cannot escape 
the fact that the narrators of history must themselves have some paradigmatic stance. 
This is inevitable; the best that can be done about this is to make as clear to the reader 
as possible what that stance is (Davis and Klaes 2003). The outcome is a range of 
narratives with no overriding narrative. 
But even Weintraub (1999) in presenting such an approach cannot avoid some 
overriding narrative. And in fact much can be gleaned by approaching history of 
thought with a view to illuminating particular methodological issues. Here we are 
concerned with issues surrounding pluralism, and history of thought can aid our 
understanding of pluralism. In particular, we can identify the origins of pluralism 
along with the origins of modern economics, in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in 
particular in the work of David Hume and in Adam Smith’s (1795) philosophy of 
science. They understood the nature of the social world as being too complex to allow 
human understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms (this was Hume’s problem 
of induction).  
In particular, reason is not an adequate basis for knowledge in itself; 
knowledge must start with sentiment, belief and experience before reason can draw 
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out provisional principles which might be acceptable explanations. Knowledge 
ultimately is founded on (social) psychology: it requires motivation to build 
knowledge in the first place (to set the mind at rest), it requires aesthetic appeal, and 
needs to connect in some way to existing knowledge in order to persuade others to 
accept it. Since knowledge is social (involving persuasion), there is no question of an 
individualistic pure pluralism rather than structured pluralism. The aim is to develop 
principles which accord with (past and new) experience; but since that experience 
changes and differs across contexts, the principles and theories can only be 
provisional. They represent an attempt to explain real causal mechanisms, while 
recognising that no one set of principles can lay claim to truth. This is a pluralist 
approach to knowledge. Further it follows that different methods are employed, and 
that a range of theories may emerge, so it is also an approach which involves 
pluralism at the level of method and theory. 
Indeed it is hard to study history of economic thought without also considering 
methodology. If we are to understand the context and intentions of the author, we also 
need to understand the methodological approach, both of the author and of alternative 
approaches which the author addresses. 
 
Integrating History of Thought and Methodology into Other Teaching 
Indeed if we are to understand modern economics we also need to understand how it 
evolved, both as a matter of historical underpinnings, but also as a matter of 
methodological approach. Ideally, then, history of thought and methodology would be 
a natural and integral part of all economics teaching. This too was a characteristic of 
the Scottish tradition (which was evident in teaching in the Scottish universities until 
a few decades ago, and continued to be evident in other systems much later). If there 
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is no one best account of (economic) knowledge, then it is important to provide a 
flavour of a range of accounts, and be able to discuss them, which in turn requires 
awareness of methodological difference with all that entails (difference of meaning, 
understanding of reality etc). 
A natural way of getting this across is to focus on debate, which expresses 
differences in relation to some issue (preferably, as in the emergence of economics in 
the teaching of moral philosophy in the eighteenth century, some topical policy issue 
with which students can engage). Indeed the virtue of teaching through controversies 
has been one of the central themes of the Post-Autistic Economics movement, which 
began with protests from French students that they were not being exposed to a range 
of views, only the mainstream approach (Fullbrook 2003; see further Groenewegen 
2007). 
Indeed it is important for students to understand how policy-making interacts 
with both academic theorising and institutional design. We can consider monetary 
policy as a good example, since it is a matter of active, and public, debate, and since 
there is also active debate about the design of monetary systems, requiring academic 
input. Karl Niebyl (1946) provides an illuminating discussion of monetary policy in 
these terms. What he argues, drawing on history of thought and methodology 
material, is that academic ideas become embedded in institutional design, which then 
sets the constraints on monetary policy making, based on ideas reflecting the power 
structure of the society. But in the meantime real conditions may be changing so that 
the ideas and institutions are no longer appropriate, causing problems which require 
that ideas and institutions be reassessed and revised, and so the evolutionary cycle 
continues.  
 16 
Thus for example, Chick (1993) argues that attempts to control the quantity of 
money arguably could be said to have been reasonable in the early days of banking 
development (when this approach to monetary policy first emerged), but were not 
appropriate to modern banking. Yet the design of such institutions as the European 
Central Bank, and the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, reflects 
these eighteenth-century views about monetary control and the independence of 
money and prices from real variables. Monetary policy for many central banks is now 
focused on inflation targets, which only make sense if indeed central banks have the 
capacity to control inflation. We are now seeing the problems emerging from the 
inappropriateness of the framework and the ideas for a period of financial instability 
and emerging stagflation; yet monetary policy, constrained by this framework, is 
having real effects, on output and employment. Chick (2008) provides an up-to-date 
application of her historical approach to theorising about banking and monetary 
policy in the current environment. 
Policy makers are more conscious than academic economists of the difficulties 
they face in putting theory into practice. It is particularly interesting that monetary 
policy makers themselves are broaching the question of pluralism. There has been 
considerable discussion of model uncertainty. This is understood as uncertainty as to 
which is the correct model (the closed-system methodological approach) or the kind 
of uncertainty Hume and Smith were addressing (an open-system reality requires an 
open system of knowledge to address the resulting uncertainty). The Bank of England 
(1999) has even made an explicit argument for pluralism as a way of addressing their 
uncertainty, by which they mean drawing on a range of partial models. They also 
draw on different types of evidence. All this requires some methodological awareness 
if we are to analyse their thinking, as well as historical awareness if we are to 
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understand how they found themselves in their current institutional environment. 
Historical awareness (of the growing power of mainstream economic thinking) also 
helps us understand why, in spite of this actual and professed espousal of pluralism in 
terms of theory and method, there is no corresponding pluralism evident at the 
methodological level (see further Downward and Mearman, forthcoming). 
 
Conclusion 
Issues raised by teaching monetary policy is just one example of how history of 
thought and methodology are an integral part of any pluralist approach to teaching. 
The science studies approach in economics would see the aim of teaching as being to 
set out a stall of theories and approaches among which students may choose. And 
indeed all practicing economists must choose one approach or another, and be able to 
defend that choice. But economics teaching also means equipping students to make 
that choice. Economics teachers inevitably each have their own preferences as to 
approach to economics. So the best way of dealing with this is to be explicit about this 
with students, so that they can understand the context and intentions of their teachers. 
But to do this they need to understand the methodological and historical concepts and 
issues involved, which means that there needs to be explicit discussion of the 
historical origins and methodological approaches of the different theories being 
taught. This should all part and parcel of pluralist teaching. 
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